近年来，西方领袖密集访问中国的非凡景象，引发各方关注与解读。尤其值得注意的是，西方智库与媒体的评论与分析中，不仅出现了地缘政治语汇的转变，过去常以警惕、对抗甚至危言耸听的措辞描绘中国，如今明显降温。西方对华外交立场本身，也出现了松动。直到不久前，中国仍被西方塑造成对内、对外的“生存性威胁”与“主要敌人”；而现在，看起来这个角色，反而转移到了美国自身。
以下列出于2024年、2025年及2026年初访问中国的主要西方领袖，以及他们各自的核心动机。
1.法国总统马克龙
时间：2025年12月3–5日
动机：战略自主：马克龙希望强化法国作为独立大国的角色，在不受美国压力左右的情况下，维持与北京的直接对话。
经济合作：双方签署了超过60项双边协议。
全球治理：他与中国国家主席习近平共同倡议建立“多极世界”。
2.德国总理肖尔茨
时间：2024年4月（国是访问）、2025年2月（战略对话）
动机：市场保全：中国仍是德国最大的贸易伙伴，肖尔茨此行旨在保护德国投资，尤其是汽车与绿能产业。
公平竞争：争取德国企业更好的市场准入条件。
3.斯洛伐克总理菲佐
时间：2025年9月（出席中国抗战胜利80周年阅兵）
动机：务实与投资：菲佐以对俄友善、质疑欧盟对华关税立场闻名，出席阅兵象征他希望深化经贸关系。
外交平衡：将斯洛伐克定位为“东西方之桥”，刻意与部分欧盟成员的强硬路线保持距离。
4.爱尔兰总理米歇尔马丁
时间：2026年1月4–8日
动机：这是爱尔兰领袖14年来首次访问中国。
开放贸易立场：在欧中贸易摩擦与美国关税压力下，马丁将爱尔兰塑造成“坚定的自由贸易倡议者”。
欧盟桥梁角色：随著爱尔兰即将轮任欧盟理事会主席国，此行意在巩固中欧关系，扮演布鲁塞尔与北京之间的外交桥梁。
5.加拿大总理卡尼
时间：2026年1月14–17日
动机：经济多元化：卡尼希望争取“互利共赢”的伙伴关系，使加拿大不再过度依赖多变的美国贸易政策。
“开放且安全”战略：他将此行定位为证明加拿大能在坚守安全原则的同时，仍对全球第二大经济体保持开放。
6.芬兰总理奥尔波
时间：2026年1月25–28日
动机：强化经贸联系与外交对话。这是芬兰17年来首次高层访华，奥尔波率领超过20名企业高层，签署了11项协议。此行重申芬兰的一个中国政策，并倡议自由贸易、战略自主，以及在化解贸易摩擦中发挥积极角色。
7.英国首相斯塔默
时间：2026年1月28–31日
动机：这是英国领袖8年来首次访华。斯塔默表示，此行旨在“重启”双边关系，透过务实且一致的伙伴关系，刺激英国经济成长。
“成熟关系”：斯塔默形容这是一种在把握商机的同时，对敏感议题设下“清醒的安全护栏”的平衡关系。
目前已确定，2026年还将有两位西方领袖访问北京：德国总理默茨将于2月24–27日率领大型经济代表团访华；美国总统特朗普则计画于4月访问中国。
特朗普推力
特朗普因素：随著特朗普重返白宫，其激进的关税政策动摇了美国的传统盟友。法国、加拿大与英国等国，正愈发将中国视为对冲美国保护主义的“稳定力量”。
经济相互依赖：西方领袖逐渐发现，“脱钩”——这个在美欧官方与半官方战略文件中反复出现的关键词——在实务上几乎不可能实现，除非付出严重通膨与供应链崩溃的代价。因此，德国与芬兰的访问，均高度聚焦于确保进入中国市场与维持制造业连结。
战略自主：欧洲与中等强国领袖（如加拿大的卡尼）将访华包装为避免沦为美国主导“围堵战略”中的“次级伙伴”，转而采取“中国＋”模式，同时维持与两大经济体的贸易关系。
西方面临的两个残酷现实
首先，“脱钩”的目标已撞上全球供应链的现实高墙。西方经济体不仅仍深度嵌入中国体系，短期内也看不到可行替代方案。例如，中国掌控全球85%–90%的稀土加工能力，这是西方选民被承诺的“绿色转型”中不可或缺的关键瓶颈。
同样重要的，还有中国在太阳能与风能技术上的主导地位，这将决定全球能否摆脱导致气候变迁的化石燃料依赖。
第二，是“孤立中国”策略的失败。中国透过将自身定位为特朗普“让美国再次伟大式混乱世界”中的稳定伙伴，有效化解西方的孤立企图。借由接待这些领袖，北京成功塑造出一个致力于“自由与开放贸易”的负责任全球行为者形象，与美国的单边主义形成鲜明对比。
结论
这一连串访问，象征著“冷战2.0”共识的瓦解。西方领袖已意识到，孤立中国，等同于孤立自己，并惩罚本国经济。因此，一种“碎片化整合”正在成形——政治语言趋于缓和，而飞往北京的专机上，坐满的是企业公司首席执行员与商贸部长。
如果说2020年代初期的主旋律是“脱钩”与“围堵”，那么当前的西方趋势，已清楚转向务实接触，以及避免在重塑中的全球秩序中被边缘化的焦虑。
可以预期，在不久的将来，“脱钩”——即西方与中国经济全面分离的叙事，将逐步被“重启”与“再接触”的词汇所取代。
林德宜《西方领袖争相与北京做生意》原文：Western Leaders Scramble To Do Business With Beijing
The extraordinary parade of Western leaders visiting China has drawn attention and explanation from many quarters. Especially noteworthy in the commentaries and analysis by Western think tanks and media is not only the shift in geopolitical lexicon previously depicting China in alarmist and confrontational terms. There also appears to be a softening in the foreign policy positioning of the West with China. Until recently China was identified and played up to the domestic and international audience as an existential threat and enemy. Now it appears to be the USA.
Below are the key Western leaders who visited China in 2024, 2025 and early 2026 and their primary motives.
1. Emmanuel Macron (President of France)
Timing: December 3–5, 2025.
Motives: Strategic Autonomy: Macron sought to reinforce France’s role as an independent power that maintains its own dialogue with Beijing regardless of U.S. pressure.
Economic Cooperation: He signed over 60 bilateral agreements.
Global Governance: He and President Xi Jinping advocated for a "multipolar world".
2. Olaf Scholz (Chancellor of Germany)
Timing: April 2024 (State Visit) and February 2025 (Strategic Dialogue).
Motives: Market Preservation: As China remains Germany’s largest trading partner, Scholz aimed to protect German investments, particularly in the automotive and green energy sectors.
Leveling the Playing Field: He pushed for better market access for German firms.
3. Robert Fico (Prime Minister of Slovakia)
Timing: September 2025 (attending China's 80th V-Day anniversary parade).
Motives: Pragmatism and Investment: Fico, known for a more Russia-friendly and skeptical stance toward EU-China tariffs, attended the military parade to signal a desire for closer economic ties.
Diplomatic Balancing: He positioned Slovakia as a "bridge" between the East and West, distancing his administration from the hawkish stance of other EU members.
4.Micheal Martin - Ireland Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
Timing: 4-8 January 2026.
Motives: This marked the first visit to China by an Irish leader in 14 years.
Open Trade Policy: Against a backdrop of EU-China trade friction and US trade tariffs, Martin positioned Ireland as a "staunch advocate" of open, free trade.
Strategic "EU Bridge" Role: With Ireland set to assume the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the visit served to shore up relations and for Ireland to act as a diplomatic bridge between Brussels and Beijing.
5.Mark Carney (Prime Minister of Canada)
Timing: 14 -17 January 2026.
Motives: Economic Diversification: Carney sought to secure "mutually beneficial" partnerships that would allow Canada to thrive independently of shifting U.S. trade policies.
"Open and Secure" Strategy: He framed the visit as a way to prove Canada could remain principled on security while remaining open to the world's second-largest economy.
6. Petteri Orpo (Finnish Prime Minister)
Timing: 25-28 January 2026,
Motives: Strengthening economic ties and diplomatic dialogue. The first visit in 17 years, Orpo accompanied by over 20 business executives signed 11 agreements. The visit, reaffirming Finland’s One China policy, with Finland advocating for free trade, strategic autonomy, and playing an active role in resolving trade frictions.
7. Keir Starmer (Prime Minister of United Kingdom)
Timing 28 - 31 January, 2026
Motives: Marking the first visit by a UK leader in eight years, Starmer stated that the primary motives were to "reset" relations and stimulate British economic growth through a "pragmatic" and "consistent" partnership.
“Sophisticated relationship": Starmer framed the visit as one that balances commercial opportunities with "clear-eyed security guardrails" on contentious issues.
For now, two more Western leaders will be visiting Beijing in 2026. Friedrich Merz, German Chancellor, is leading a large economic delegation from 24 - 27 February; and Donald Trump, U.S. President is planning to visit Beijing in April.
Trump Push Factor
The "Trump Factor": With Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. Presidency, his administration’s aggressive tariff policies have unsettled traditional U.S. allies. Countries like France, Canada and the UK are increasingly looking to China as a "stabilizing force" to hedge against U.S. protectionism.
Economic Interdependence: Western leaders are finding that “decoupling” - a word widely used in official and unofficial American and European economic strategy reports on China -is practically impossible without severe domestic inflation and supply chain collapse of national and regional economies. Thus, German and Finnish visits have been heavily focused on securing access to China’s. markets and maintaining manufacturing ties.
Strategic Autonomy: European and Middle-Power leaders (like Canada’s Mark Carney) are framing their visits as a way to ensure they are not merely "junior partners" in a U.S.- led containment strategy, opting instead for a "China-plus-one" model that maintains trade with both giants.
Two Grim Realities For The West
What is apparent is that the goal of "decoupling" has met the hard wall of global supply chain reality. Western economies remain not only deeply integrated with China but have no short term options in sight. For example, China controls 85–90% of global rare earth processing, a critical bottleneck for the "Green Transition" that Western leaders have promised their voters.
Just as significant is China's dominance in solar and wind power technologies that will allow the world to break free from climate changing fossil fuel dependency.
The second is the failure of "Isolation". China has effectively countered Western isolation by positioning itself as the stable partner in a chaotic - Trump MAGA world. By hosting these leaders, Beijing has successfully projected itself as a responsible global actor committed to "free and open trade," contrasting itself with U.S. unilateralism.
Conclusion
The recent parade of visits represent a collapse of the "Cold War 2.0" consensus. Western leaders have realized they cannot isolate China without isolating themselves and punishing their own economies. Thus we see the move toward a "fragmented integration" where political rhetoric has become less hostile and the planes of Western leaders to Beijing are full of CEOs and trade ministers.
While "decoupling" and "containment" were the dominant themes of the early 2020s, current Western trends indicate a shift toward pragmatic engagement and the concern that their countries not be left behind in the changing global order.
Expect to see in the coming future the narrative of decoupling - the total separation of Western and Chinese economies - replaced by the vocabulary of reset and re-engagement.
本文观点，不代表《东方日报》立场。
公共政策分析学者
