黄大志：二战后华巫关系的关键时刻

不久前上网寻找科研材料时，意外发现学者莫里森（Ian Morrison）撰写的一篇论文，题为 《Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya（马来亚的种族若干问题）》，刊载在1949年的太平洋事务学报上 (Pacific Affairs)。

该文分析了二战后马来亚的政治局势以及英国殖民宗主国与各族之间的关系与立场，作者以旁观者清又相对客观的写法，让读者更能体会种族关系发展事态的伊始。

笔者想借该文内容与自身对马来亚历史的认识，发表此文，希望能帮助厘清华社某些人经常从以讹传讹的信息来看待华人的处境，对真实情况能有一个较为宽阔的理解，并由此更有能力面对未来。

文章一开头就引述一名英国经济学教授T.H. Silcock写给伦敦《时报》的一封信，信的内容大意是说：在马来亚对付几千名共产主义恐怖分子不是什么问题，维持马来亚橡胶和锡的金钱流动也不是问题，因为这些都是琐碎而短暂的事。真正的问题是马来亚半岛的三个种族（华人，马来人和印度人）在没有把他们的国家变成一个毒瘤的前提下，如何幸福的生活在一起。争论谁是移民、谁先到达这片土地、由谁负责未来都是消耗时光而又徒劳无功的。

1948年，马来亚“紧急状态”已经开始，马共已走进森林打游击战。从莫里森的上述看法，他似乎预测到由苏联第三共产国际在1930年代初建立的马来亚共产党支部难于成功。马共想依赖像中国、越南和朝鲜等土地剥削斗争，在马来亚基本不存在，因为几乎所有马来稻农都是自耕农，没地主可斗。

在英国的工农业国际分工策略下，不在马来亚设立工业，殖民地只提供橡胶业、锡矿业等工业原材料，这类产业工人又主要来自外来移民及其后代，他们在马来亚虽穷，但比起原居地的生活条件要好，对推翻英国统治基本没积极性，更重要的是他们缺乏建设本土化国家的意愿。

基于上述因素的考虑，我们就不难理解，老谋深算的英国会竟然决定耗巨资增兵打击马共势力，想必有其取胜的把握，值得一干，否则无疑会像在印度和缅甸一样，一走了之。果不期然，英澳联军在“紧急状态”期间在马来乡村实行“保卫团”（Home guard）计划，在华人聚居的乡区建立了约500个华人新村，阻断了马共的补给供应线，就这样切断了马共的鱼和水的联系，使之走向失败。

马来民族主义的兴起

英殖民者侧重的种族关系，从开始的分而治之到二战后的华巫合作，其目的不外是想以和谐来维护英国的资本势力，包括为马来亚筹划的战后和平移交政权。莫里森文中提到在二战期间，位于伦敦的英国殖民办公厅就设立了马来亚规划署，为马来亚的未来自治作准备。

对华巫两族的数量和分布问题，该署以1931年的人口普查为根据，发现如果把3个海峡殖民地（新加坡、槟城、马六甲）、4个马来联邦（霹雳、雪兰莪、彭亨、森美兰）和5个非马来联邦（玻璃市、吉打、登嘉楼、吉兰丹、柔佛），合并成同一政体，并逐步和平移交政权建立民选政府，华人人数将占39.1%，超过马来人的37.2%，对经济处于弱势的马来族不利。

此外，有鉴于100多年来，英国均是通过威迫利诱方式取得各州统治者签订条约接纳英国的“保护”，任何新的合并条约也非得取得各州苏丹的首肯不可。很自然的，加入新加坡会难于得到统治者们的接受。

1946年，英殖民者颁布的马来亚联盟白皮书把新加坡排除在外，但终因白皮书建议赋予所有华人和印裔公民权，而遭到统治者反对，并由此催生了带有马来民族主义的巫统向殖民者施压。

接下来的两年间，英国人想促成种族和谐的原意，在巫统和统治者不断的周璇和讨价还价的工作会议上，不但促成了1948年马来亚联邦宪法阐明马来人的特殊地位，也给随后的种族关系埋下了危害性的伏笔。

至于民间反对的声音，基本微弱。中华总商会虽曾与其他团体联合致信英国殖民办公厅，表示对宪法“完全失望”、“宪法将给社会带来不可妥协的两个对立、互不信任和非和谐的群体”，并呼吁英国设立一个新的皇家委员会，重新制定宪法。 但这都没有动摇该由巫统和统治者参与的工作会议的决策走向，而这个工作委员会连一个华人和印裔都没有。

对华社更不利的是，马共游击战一般被看成是华人的政治运动之一。英殖民政府召兵对付马共得到巫统的支援，巫统看到这是发展马来武装力量的大好机会，并从两个团成功组建成四个马来军团。随后构建的联邦军队，几乎全由马来人垄断。随著马来民族主义的兴起，原先多元种族化的工会运动，马来领袖也逐渐脱离并成立了一些清一色以马来人为主的工会组织。

跟马来民族主义相反的是，当年的华团基本和今天的态度不变，采取的是非政治化立场和非本土化的旁观姿态。文章还指出，马华公会1949年的成立，还是在英国驻马最高专员格尼爵士的催促下完成的。围绕在格尼身边的自然是些基本不谙本土政治的华商，后来也就成了马华领袖，除了商业利益，期望他们为华社争取权益是要求过高了吧？

《二战后华巫关系的关键时刻》（A Critical Moment in Chinese-Malay Relations After World War II）英文稿：

Not long ago, while looking through the Internet for research material, I found a paper entitled "Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya", published in 1949 by a scholar Ian Morrison in the journal “Pacific Affairs”. 

This paper analyzes the political situation in Malaya after World War II and the position taken by the British colonial power and its assessment over the Chinese-Malay relations. As an insightful political observer, Morrison has provided us with valuable and objective analysis that makes us more aware as readers of the development of race relations at this critical juncture immediately after World War II. 

I wish to draw here the essence of Morrison’s article, together with my own understanding of the Malayan history, to inform the public of the real situation taking place at that time. I hope by so doing I could help clarify the hearsay stories that some people from the Chinese community have been misinformed over the years. Arguably, knowing the truth could often help one to broaden one’s views and capacity in facing challenges in the future.

Morrison’s article begins with a quote from a British economics professor T.H. Silcock's letter to the London Times which read: 

It is not the problem of dealing with a few thousand Communist terrorists. It is not the problem of maintaining the flow of dollars from Malayan rubber and tin … These are trivial and ephemeral matters compared with the real problem … [The real problem is] there are representatives of three races, Chinese, Malay and Indian, [and] these races are so inextricably tangled in one economic network that no serious person can consider wholly removing any one element. It is futile to waste much time in arguing who immigrated when and why, and who is responsible. The practical problem is how these races are going to live together without turning their country into an ulcer …

In 1948, the Malayan "State of Emergency" had begun, and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had entered the jungle to fight guerrilla warfare. From Morrison's point of view, he seemed to have predicted that the Malayan Communist Branch, established by the Soviet Third International in the early 1930s, would have great difficulties to succeed. What the MCP could rely on to fight for their cause such as landlord exploitation in China, Vietnam and North Korea, was basically non-existent in Malaya, where almost all Malay rice farmers were self-cultivators. There were no big landlords to fight on in order to redistribute their lands to the landless for support. 

Under the British strategy of international division of labour within the framework of industrial core versus agricultural periphery, the British did not set up any industry in Malaya. As a colony, Malaya had no industrial workers as it only supplied rubber, tin and other raw materials to the industrial core countries. In the tin mines and rubber estates, workers were mainly immigrants and their descendants. Although they were poor in Malaya, they enjoyed better living conditions than their places of origin. They were largely not motivated to overthrow British rule, and more importantly, they lacked the will to build a nation of their own in Malaya.

Based on the above features, it is not difficult to understand why the wily and calculating British colonial power had decided to mobilize large troops to fight the MCP forces, on presumption that they would stand a good chance of victory, and it was worth doing it. Alternatively, they could have walked away free and easy as they did in India and Myanmar. Sure enough, during the "State of Emergency", the British and Australian forces implemented a "Home Guard" program in the Malay villages, and resettled rural Chinese residents into about 500 Chinese new villages with tight security. After their supply lines were blocked, the MCP guerrillas lost their fish and water links with the population, which led to their ultimate defeat.

After World War II, the British did change their “Divide and Rule” tactic to peaceful coexistence on race relations, as a measure to protect their interests while preparing a peaceful transfer of power planned for Malaya. As Morrison mentioned, during World War II, the British Colonial Office in London had already drafted a program to prepare for the forthcoming autonomy of Malaya. 

Based on the 1931 population census, the Colonial Office found that if the three Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca), the four Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang, Negri Sembilan) and the five Non-Federated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu, Kelantan, Johor) were merged into one and the same political entity, the number of Chinese would account for 39.1%, more than the 37.2% of the Malays. Such a situation would be a great disadvantage to the economically vulnerable Malays when peaceful transfer of power was executed for an elected government. 

Moreover, given that for more than 100 years, Britain had acquired through coercion from the Malay rulers the "protection" authority by treaty agreements, any new merger deal must also have the consent from the sultans. Naturally, they did not expect the rulers would accept if Singapore was included.

In 1946, the British issued a white paper on the Malayan Union that excluded Singapore. But it was still opposed by the rulers because of its proposal to grant citizenship to all Chinese and Indians. Together with the newly established United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which was highly Malay interest-oriented, they formed a coalition to put pressure on the colonial government. 

Over the two subsequent years, the British's desire to promote racial harmony lost its track in a Working Committee they chaired as a result of multiple bargaining sessions with the representatives of UMNO and the Malay rulers. The end product was the 1948 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya which specified the special position of Malays, thus laying a damaging effect on race relations. 

Voices of civil opposition against the 1948 Constitution were basically weak. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in conjunction with other groups, did write to the British Colonial Office to express their "total disappointment" with the Constitution. They felt that it would bring about uncompromisable opposition between races, mistrust and disharmony to society, and they called for a new royal commission to rewrite the constitution. But that had not shaken the decision-making direction of the Working Committee, involving representatives from UMNO and the rulers but none from the Chinese and Indian communities.

For the Chinese community, it was even worse as the communist guerrilla warfare was generally regarded as one of their political movements. The British colonial government’s calls for military build-up had met with UMNO’s support, and UMNO saw this as a great opportunity to develop their own ethnic-based armed forces. The Malay Regiment expanded from two battalions to four, and the federal army that was subsequently built was almost entirely monopolized by Malays. 

Contrary to Malay nationalism, the attitude of the Chinese associations remained basically inactive, taking a non-politicized stance and a non-localized orientation. Morrison’s article also points out that the Malayan Chinese Association, set up in 1949, came into being at the urging of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. Understandably, as Gurney was surrounded by Chinese businessmen, who were hardly conscious in local politics, they were later made to become MCA leaders. For these leaders whose focus was largely business interests, how could we expect them to fight for the rights and interests of the Chinese community?