林德宜：特朗普“让美国再次伟大”三极世界秩序

2026年1月初，美国军方绑架委内瑞拉总统马杜罗及其夫人一事，可视为特朗普正在为美国乃至世界重塑“三极世界秩序”的第一根重要支柱。

在这三极战略下，特朗普政府并非试图回到冷战时期的两极格局（美国对苏联），也没有把中国或俄罗斯单独界定为当今的“生存性威胁”或头号敌人。

同样地，特朗普也无意维系1991年后由美国主导、近年来逐步式微的单极自由主义国际秩序。相反，特朗普已意识到，若不重新塑造美国在世界秩序与体系中的主导地位，他将无法真正“让美国再次伟大”。

其原因不言自明。过去二十年间，西方主导的全球秩序逐步解体：非西方国家崛起、西方阵营内部分裂加剧，以及全新形式的全球竞争不断涌现。

这种崩解并非源于单一失误，而是一场由结构性、经济性与国内政治因素交织而成的“完美风暴”。其中最核心的动因，来自美国自身的内部演变、西方新殖民力量的衰退，以及中国的崛起。

显而易见，这三个因素——“其馀世界的崛起”、美国内部的撕裂，以及欧洲的相对衰退与自由主义秩序的内在矛盾——促使特朗普采取行动，推动一个他所构想的世界：划分为三个彼此区隔、互不重叠的势力范围，即由美国主导的西方圈、由俄罗斯主导的欧洲圈，以及由中国主导的亚洲圈。

这一构想，代表著美国放弃全球霸权时代的根本结构。特朗普不再试图透过一个日益失去尊重、且被广泛视为虚伪甚至双重标准的自由主义国际秩序来“治理”全世界——该秩序衰退，最近更因对以色列在加沙推动的种族灭绝式战争表现出冷漠而暴露无遗。相反地，特朗普正引导世界走向一个由三大强权分别主导各自势力范围的体系，其中美国自居为“众强之首”，力图维持主导地位，甚至接近霸权。

三极体系结构

特朗普政府于2025年公布的《国家安全战略》（NSS）已隐约承认三个主要、并存的权力中心。其目标并非消灭中国或俄罗斯，而是透过交易式安排加以围堵与管理，在减轻美国全球负担的同时，最大化美国自身的回报。

美国势力圈

这是美国运作的“堡垒”，聚焦于资源开采、区域供应链、边境安全等议题，以回应国内选民、实现“让美国再次伟大”。在此脉络下，拥有丰富石油资源的委内瑞拉成为首个目标；而格陵兰岛亦被列为国家安全优先事项，原因在于其战略军事位置与自然资源。

在特朗普任内，乃至下一位共和党总统执政时期，加拿大不再被视为“特殊盟友”，而是沦为次要伙伴，其主权让位于美国的安全与经济利益。关于吞并加拿大或其部分领土的讨论，已从口头恫吓转变为特朗普政府外交政策的核心议题之一。

特朗普强调控制委内瑞拉、并从其石油中获利，宣称此举可使美国势力圈达致自给自足，免受中国日益严峻的经济挑战。然而，这种公然违背外交惯例、区域主权与国际关系原则的单边行动，同时也是对整个南美洲各国发出的警告：必须接受美国对该地区的宗主权。

欧洲／俄罗斯势力圈

特朗普在欧洲推行的“务实收缩”政策——包括推动以谈判方式结束俄乌战争——实际上等同于承认俄罗斯在欧洲的势力范围。

透过削减对北约在乌克兰的援助，特朗普明确释放讯号：欧洲安全应由欧洲自行承担。同时，他又成功迫使北约盟友在2035年前将国防与安全开支提升至国内生产总值（GDP）的5%，使北约不再只是美国的“有用傻瓜”。这一史无前例的军费激增，将为美国军工产业开辟庞大的销售管道。

在未来五年（2026—2030），美国对北约盟国的军火销售总额预计将超过4000亿美元／1.6兆令吉。确保美国经济不在当前的财政危机中崩溃，是其三极战略的关键一环，因此扩大对外军售以创造就业，成为必要手段。

中国势力圈

相较于美国与欧洲势力圈的明显动作，特朗普的亚洲布局仍在成形之中。目前，在与北京陷入贸易战的背景下，特朗普政府正由单一的军事围堵，转向结合经济围堵，并要求日本、韩国等盟友协助重建美国的工业与高科技制造能力。

中国在特朗普三极框架中的定位，构成前所未有的挑战，因为中国透过共产党体制，提供了一种成功的政治与社会经济发展模式，对自由民主与美国资本主义的吸引力形成实质冲击。

因此，特朗普对中国势力圈的处理，转向更为细腻、交易化与区域化的策略。这意味著美国逐步退出二战后“亚太警察”的角色，改由澳洲与日本担任“副警长”，以维持有利于美国的区域现状。

在4月访问北京前，特朗普曾表态愿意“分享世界”，前提是中国尊重并让渡美国利益。近期分析指出，只要访问成果能促成重大贸易协议、缓解美国的财政脆弱性，特朗普并不特别在意、也未必致力于反制中国在第一岛链（如南海与台湾）的主权主张。

特朗普的三极世界秩序能否运作？

目前仍言之过早，难以预测特朗普的三极世界秩序及其经济层面的全球体系将如何成形与运作。除三极结构本身的内在不稳定性外，即便有关税战带来的短期回报，美国经济似乎仍不足以支撑“让美国再次伟大”的全球雄心。

无论未来世界秩序如何演变，处于三大势力圈内的小国，仍须持续捍卫自身的政治与经济主权，并运用集体力量，制衡大国，以确保国际关系中的公平与正义。

对全球南方国家而言，强而有力的领导、坚实的自力更生能力，以及加入金砖国家组织（BRICS），或许将成为在任何形式的三极世界秩序下，确保安全与福祉的另一层重要保障。

林德宜《特朗普“让美国再次伟大”三极化世界秩序》原文：Trump's Tripolar MAGA World Order

The abduction of Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in early January 2026 conducted by the United States (US) military can be seen as the first major pillar of a tripolar world order that Trump is defining for the US and the world.

Under this tripolar strategy, the Trump administration is not seeking a return to the bipolar Cold War (US vs. USSR) era with China or Russia singled out as the existential threat and enemy today.

Neither is he intent on propping up the post-1991 unipolar liberal order of which the US has been the undoubted leader until recently. Instead, he has recognized his inability to ”make America great again” without reinventing the US dominance of the world order and system.

Why he is doing so is self-evident. The last 20 years has seen the breakdown of the western dominated global order marked by the rise of non-Western powers, internal fractures in the Western bloc, and the emergence of new forms of global competition.

This breakdown is not the result of a single failure. Rather It is a perfect storm of structural, economic, and domestic factors, with the main stemming from developments within the US, the decline of western neo-colonial power, and the rise of China.

It is clear that these three components - the "rise of the rest," the internal fracturing of the US, and the decline of Europe and inherent contradictions of the liberal order - have galvanised Trump into action toward a world that he sees and wants divided into three distinct, non-overlapping spheres of influence: the Western led by the US, the European led by Russia, and the Asian led by China.

This vision represents a fundamental departure from the era of US global hegemony. Instead of trying to police the entire world through an increasingly disrespected and widely regarded as duplicitous and even hypocritical liberal world order most recently exposed by its indifference to the genocidal war pursued by Israel in Gaza, Trump is steering toward a system where three major powers dominate their respective spheres of influence, with the US asserting itself as the "first among equals" and maintaining dominance, if not hegemony.

Geometry of the Tripolar System

The Trump administration's 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) implicitly recognized three primary coexisting centers of power. Its goal is not to eliminate China or Russia as rivals, but to contain and manage them through transactional deals that reduce US global burdens whilst maximizing returns for America.

The American Sphere

This is the fortress from which the US operates, focusing on resource extraction, regional supply chains, border security and other concerns to make America great for the domestic constituency. It is one in which Venezuela, with its oil wealth, became the first target, with Greenland in the cross-hair now a national security priority, due to the island's strategic military position and natural resources.

Under Trump as well as the next incoming Republican president, Canada is no longer treated as a "special ally" but will be a junior partner whose sovereignty is secondary to US security and economic interests. Discussions regarding the potential annexation of Canada or its territories have moved from rhetorical threats to a central focus of the Trump administration's foreign policy.

Trump’s focus on controlling Venezuela and minting money from its oil has been touted as designed to make his American sphere self-sufficient and immune to the increasing economic challenge from China. However, this unilateral action against diplomatic norms, regional sovereignty and international relations principles is also intended to warn all South American governments to accept US overlordship of the region.

The European/Russian Sphere

Trump’s policy of "pragmatic retrenchment" in Europe - including his push for a negotiated end to the Ukraine conflict - effectively acknowledges a Russian sphere of influence in Europe.

By reducing US support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Ukraine, Trump has signalled that European security is a European problem. At the same time, he has successfully manoeuvred NATO to be more than the US’s useful idiot by pressuring his allies to spend 5% of their GDP on defence and security by 2035. This unprecedented surge will create a massive pipeline for US armament sales.

Over the next five years (2026–2030), total sales of US armaments to NATO allies are expected to exceed US$400 billion. Ensuring that the American economy does not implode from its current fiscal crisis is a key part of his tripolar strategy. Hence increased US armament sales to the rest of the world is necessary to create American jobs.

The Chinese Sphere

Whilst Trump's remaking of the American and European spheres have seen much action, that in Asia appears to be a work in progress. For now, with the US locked in a trade war with Beijing, the Trump administration is pivoting from its emphasis on military containment to include economic containment, with new demands that allies like Japan and South Korea help rebuild the US industrial and hi-tech manufacturing sectors.

The evolution of the China segment of the tripolar framework of Trump’s administration has posed an unprecedented challenge because China offers an exceptional model of political and socio-economic development through a communist government that has successfully challenged the appeal of liberal democracy and American capitalism.

Hence, the Trump handling of the Chinese sphere has seen a shift to a more nuanced transactional and regionalized strategy. This approach basically moves the US away from its post-WWII policeman of Asia Pacific role and leaves Australia and Japan as deputy sheriffs to maintain the regional status quo in favour of the US.

Before his April visit to Beijing, Trump had indicated a willingness to "share the world," provided China respects and gives way to US interests. Recent analyses suggest Trump is not concerned with or committed to countering Chinese claims in the First Island Chain (e.g., the South China Sea and Taiwan) if the visit outcome facilitates a major trade deal to reduce US financial frailty.

Can Trump's Tripolar World Order Work

It is early days to predict how Trump’s tripolar world order and associated world system in the economic realm will shape and work out. Apart from the inherent instability of tripolarity, Trump's economy, even with its tariff war returns, does not appear healthy enough to sustain the global ambitions of MAGA.

Whatever lies ahead in the world order dynamics, smaller nations in the three spheres will have to continue defending their political and economic sovereignty and leverage their collective weight on the major powers to ensure fairness and justice in international relations.

For countries in the South, the combination of strong leadership, robust self-reliance and BRICS membership may be necessary to provide an additional layer of security and well-being in any permutation of the tripolar world order.

本文观点，不代表《东方日报》立场。