未来数周内，美国最高法院预料将就特朗普政府对全球发动的关税战是否合法作出裁决。该案的核心，在于总统是否有权依据《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA），绕过国会，单方面实施大规模的“对等关税”或“全面关税”。然而，无论裁决结果如何，这宗案件对美国政府实际操作的地缘政治与国际关系，恐怕都不会产生实质影响。
观察人士指出，多数大法官对政府如此广泛动用IEEPA权力持怀疑态度，因为此类权力传统上属于国会。不过，鉴于当前最高法院并非真正独立，其保守派多数又对特朗普有所倚重，几乎不可能在涉及削弱或动摇美国国际贸易政策的议题上，作出令特朗普难堪的裁决。
即便最高法院最终否定以IEEEPA为基础的关税措施，政府也已表明可转而援引其他法律架构来延续其贸易政策，这包括国家安全、不公平贸易行为，以及国际收支相关权限。这些法律手段，构成了美国政府在任何贸易政策问题上几乎无懈可击的武器库。
因此，无论美国国内的反对声音来自何方，关税政策都不太可能出现改变。真正的关键人物，是关税战的发动者——特朗普本人（他曾称关税是“最美丽的字眼”，并能“让我们富得不得了”），以及其核心团队：美国财长贝森特、贸易代表格里尔、商务部长卢特尼克与贸易代表莱特希泽。在他们眼中，关税不是税收，而是一种主要的谈判工具，用于地缘政治施压与振兴本土制造业。
美国所承担的成本
评估这场贸易战的成败与代价，必须观察具体的经济数据。迈入2026年之际，多项指标显示，全面关税政策正遭遇显著阻力。
尽管美国政府强调联邦税收增加、股市表现强劲，批评者与非党派数据却指出，贸易战在多个层面出现反效果，甚至未能实现其核心目标。
贸易逆差扩大
关税政策的主要目标之一，是缩小美国贸易逆差，但2025年的数据却显示结果恰恰相反。2025年前三个季度，美国贸易逆差接近8400亿美元／3.2兆令吉，主因在于美国企业在新一轮关税生效前“提前进口”、大量囤货。
2026年初的数据显示，美国与欧洲、中国及墨西哥的年度货物贸易逆差略有收窄，但整体逆差仍然庞大。若此趋势持续，民主党势必会在政治上将其作为关税战失败的主要证据。
物价上涨
这一指标很可能成为中期选举的焦点。关税本质上是对进口商课税，而成本最终转嫁给消费者。预计2026年美国家庭平均将因物价上涨而承担约1300美元／5080令吉的额外负担。核心消费品价格明显飙升，其中皮革制品价格上涨高达36%，服装上涨34%，新车平均价格则每辆增加约5700美元／2.2万令吉。
通膨居高不下
另一项令政府头痛的问题，是整体通膨率持续偏高。经济学家指出，关税本身为通膨率额外推升约0.75个百分点。
对成长与就业的冲击
尽管政府宣称要打造制造业“奇迹”，宏观经济数据却显示经济正在降温。透过强硬手段迫使他国投资美国、创造制造业就业，或许在一定程度上可行，但其效果需以年计，而非数月内实现。目前所谓的关税带动就业，更多仍停留在纸面上。一旦特朗普不再掌权，这些“工作机会”极可能迅速消失。
发展中国家的代价
“让美国再次伟大”的关税政策，已对发展中国家，尤其是体量较小、谈判筹码有限的国家，造成严重冲击。
其负面影响主要体现在以下几个层面：
生产者
对许多发展中国家而言，美国是最重要的出口市场。突如其来的高额“对等关税”打乱了这些关键贸易链。2025年初，超过70个国家的制造商因成本过高而暂停对美出口。东南亚若干高度专业化的制造业更是首当其冲，几近重创。
产业冲击
高度依赖单一出口品项的国家——如孟加拉与越南的纺织业——订单大幅萎缩，因美国进口商转向本土生产或所谓的“友好国家”。
中小企业
相较跨国企业，发展中国家的中小企业缺乏资本转向新市场。东盟各国至今尚未全面统计关税战的成本，但一旦完成评估，最受冲击的势必是区域内的小型生产者。
在马来西亚，中小企业普遍利润微薄、资本有限，现行19%的关税往往已超过其整体利润率，迫使企业在调涨价格或亏本经营之间艰难抉择。
消费者
虽然关税是美国的税收措施，但其对全球供应链的冲击，为发展中国家带来“进口型通膨”。报复性关税与全球价格上涨，使非美国消费者的基本生活用品变得更加昂贵。
对全球南方的结构性伤害
联合国贸易与发展会议（UNCTAD）及世界银行的经济学家指出，全球贸易体系正在碎片化，而受害最深的，正是最脆弱的国家与社群。
美国是否伤己最深？
特朗普关税战最具讽刺意味之处，除了对美国消费者造成的双重伤害外，还在于这项原本旨在孤立中国、强化“美国优先”的政策，反而在多个关键层面产生反效果——将其他国家在地缘政治与经济上推向北京。
关税最初意在惩罚中国，但全球性的外溢效应并未留下真空。当包括美国多个坚定盟友在内的国家感受到美国保护主义的挤压时，他们并未选择退缩，而是寻找新的经济出路，而这股“新氧气”，主要来自中国。
特朗普或许将成为推动新一轮世界经济秩序形成的最重要催化剂——而这极可能是他日后最为后悔的结果。
林德宜《特朗普关税战代价：谁伤最重？》原文：Trump's Tariff War Cost: Who Did It Hurt
In the next few weeks, the US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the Trump administration's tariff war against the world is likely to be made known. The case, centering on whether the President has the authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to bypass Congress and impose sweeping "reciprocal" or "universal" tariffs, will really not be of any consequence in the geopolitics and international relations conducted by the US administration.
Observers note that the justices appeared largely skeptical of the administration's broad use of IEEPA as this is a power typically reserved for Congress. However, it is unlikely that the current court of not so independent judicial minds, with its conservative majority beholden to President Trump will defy or embarrass him with judgment on an issue that undercuts or undermines American policy on international trade and commerce.
Even if the Supreme Court invalidates the IEEPA-based tariffs, the administration has signaled its ability to shift to other legal frameworks to maintain its trade policy. These include those related to national security, unfair trade practices and balance of payments authority. These comprise a virtually unbeatable arsenal for the administration in any trade policy issue.
Hence, expect no change in US tariff policy whoever and whatever the opposition is within the States. The pivotal players are its initiators - Trump (tariffs is the “most beautiful word “ and “make us rich as hell”) and his team of Scott Bessent, Jamieson Greer, Howard Lutnick and Robert Lighthizer. They view tariffs not as a tax but as a primary negotiating tool for geopolitical leverage and domestic manufacturing revival.
Costs For The US
Tracking the success or cost of the trade war requires monitoring specific economic data points. As we move into 2026, various indicators suggest that the sweeping tariff policies have encountered significant friction.
While the administration points to increased federal revenue and a robust stock market, critics and non-partisan data highlight several areas where the trade war has backfired or failed to meet its primary objectives.
Widening Trade Deficit
A primary goal of the tariffs was to reduce the US trade deficit. However, 2025 data shows the opposite occurred. In the first three quarters of 2025, the trade deficit rose to nearly $840 billion. Much of this was driven by American companies "front-loading" or rushing to import goods before new tariff deadlines took effect.
Early 2026 data shows a modest narrowing of the annual goods deficit with Europe, China, and Mexico, though the overall deficit remains large. Should this trend continue, Democrats will be focusing on this as a primary indicator of the tariff war failure.
Consumer Price Inflation
This indicator is likely to take centre stage in the midterm elections. Tariffs are effectively taxes on importers, and these costs have been passed down to consumers. Estimates for 2026 suggest the average US household will face an additional tax burden of roughly $1,300 due to higher prices. With core consumer goods prices spiking, prices for specific categories have surged. Prices for leather products rose by up to 36%, apparel by 34%, and motor vehicles by an average of $5,700 per new car.
Persistent Inflation
Another concern for the administration is that overall inflation has remained high. Economists note that tariffs added approximately 0.75 percentage points to the inflation rate.
Impact on Growth and Employment
Despite the administration's goal of sparking a manufacturing "miracle," the broader macroeconomic data suggests a cooling effect. Strong arm tactics to compel other countries to invest in the US to create manufacturing jobs may work to some extent but this will take years, not months to materialise. Tariff induced job gains for now remains largely on paper. These ‘jobs’ are likely to disappear once Trump is no longer around or in power.
Costs for Developing Countries
The ripple effects of the MAGA tariff policies have significantly strained the economies of developing nations, especially smaller and less "leveraged" ones.
The adverse effects on these countries can be broken down into various key categories:
Producers
For many developing nations, the US is the primary destination for their exports. The sudden imposition of high "reciprocal" tariffs has disrupted these vital trade links. Manufacturers in over 70 countries halted shipments to the U.S. in early 2025 due to prohibitive costs. Specific categories with specialized manufacturing hubs in Southeast Asia have been devastated.
Sector-Specific Hits
Countries reliant on a narrow range of exports—such as textile producers in Bangladesh and Vietnam—have seen orders dry up as US importers shift to domestic sources or "friendly" nations.
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
Unlike large multinationals, SMEs in developing nations lack the capital to pivot to new markets. ASEAN countries have yet to total up the cost of the tariff war. When they do, it is likely that the region's small producers will be found to be hit hardest.
SMEs in Malaysia typically operate on thinner margins and have less capital so that the prevailing 19% tariff often exceeds their total profit margin. Many SMEs have had to choose between raising prices or absorbing the cost and operating at a loss.
Consumers
While the tariffs are US taxes, their impact on global supply chains creates imported inflation for consumers in developing nations. Retaliatory measures and global price hikes have made essential goods more expensive for non American consumers.
Structural Damage to the Global South
Economists at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank have highlighted a fragmentation of the global trading system that disproportionately hurts the most vulnerable.
Has the U.S. Hurt Itself Most Of All
Perhaps the most ironic feature of Trump's tariff war, apart from its double edged impact on American consumers, is how a policy designed to isolate China and bolster "America First" has, in several key ways, backfired by pushing other nations closer to Beijing - geopolitically and economically. While the tariffs were initially intended to punish China, the global fallout has created more than a vacuum. When nations - including many staunch US allies - felt the squeeze of American protectionism, they didn't hunker down; they looked for new economic oxygen, and this is mainly coming from China.
Trump may just be the most significant catalyst to a new world economic order in a way he will regret.
本文观点，不代表《东方日报》立场。
公共政策分析学者
