黄大志：叶亚来的黑社会身份可耻吗？

吉隆坡的开拓者叶亚来的黑社会身份是否可耻，见仁见智。马来民族主义者以叶亚来的黑社会身份为由，将它归纳为社会底层领袖，不配被视为正派社会领袖。至于叶亚来是否真的是吉隆坡的开拓者，出于种族政治的考量，马来民族主义者更是不愿承认，反而提出在1857年叶亚来到达之前，马来先民已在今天吉隆坡市中心的巴生河与鹅唛河交汇处的北边定居为依据，进行驳斥。

少数马来先民在叶亚来之前确实在今吉隆坡某处聚居，这应属事实，因为马来民族历来依河水而居，过著传统的稻米耕种与捕鱼生活，随处可见。但关键在于“开拓”二字的深刻内涵，开拓理论上与自给自足的传统稻米耕种和捕鱼关系不大。开拓应与经济开发有著密切的关联，而吉隆坡的开拓首要元素便是华人积极参与国际贸易相关的锡矿开采活动，从而引发了吉隆坡后续的城市发展。

另一方面，华社某些学者却如同掩耳盗铃，试图维护早期华社领袖的形象与捍卫民族尊严。这类学者的论点是，华人已经遭到他族的欺凌与挤压，若再讨论先贤的缺点及其黑社会身份，不岂是助长他人之志、削弱自身威风的民族罪人吗？绝不可行！因此，在研究早期华社领袖时，必须抑恶扬善，能说成贤良的就尽量说成贤良，并对已逝者表现出最大的尊敬，绝不提及前辈的历史污点。如此做法既不冒犯该前辈的后代，也为整体华社维护了面子与尊严，在面对不友善的友族时，更不会给予他们任何损害华社的把柄。

然而，问题在于，160多年前的马来亚华人社会，华社领袖的黑社会身份，在当时的价值观与殖民社会中是否被视为可耻？在回答这一问题之前，我们需从当时继承了中国封建社会特征与人治土壤的背景谈起。

黑社会的社会基础
马新两地曾经盛行的私会党与美国的黑手党相似，均是分别源自中国和意大利的移民聚集而成的结晶。中国的黑社会组织在马新两地演变为俗称的私会党。中国传统社会的黑社会组织在过去的帝王专制时代极为活跃，并成为一种历史传统。民间通过地缘、业缘、血缘及政治目的等秘密途径组成帮会。

在缺乏法治、法令不被遵循以及官吏权限不受制衡的情况下，而官府又普遍得依靠民间供奉的额外收入以帮补朝廷给予的微薄薪酬，黑社会组织便成为自保、霸占特殊利益或依靠实力与官府合作的渠道。既然有官府的庇护，黑社会组织中便不乏涉及官府垄断的盐巴生意、贩毒、抢劫、开赌包娼及贩卖人口等活动。

由于黑社会组织拥有自身的经济来源与实力，因而能够利用这些资源来笼络官府以求生存。然而，为了保护自身的地盘与收入渠道，它们必须拥有自己的武装力量，以对抗潜在威胁的敌对帮会，并维持非法生意，恐吓富商或受人雇佣进行勒索。以当今的社会道德标准来看，这无疑属于一种职业犯罪集团所形成的亚文化小社会。这类犯罪组织拥有自身的财政与治安机制，并与掌管主体文化的执政当局存在著强烈的利益冲突与对抗关系，而成为受制裁的对象。

马来亚华人黑社会与英殖民的妥协关系
但在19世纪中叶的马来亚殖民社会，华人黑社会组织并不是纯粹的非法组织。血液中带著上述亚文化基因、属于社会底层的中国贫困农民向外移民时，组织帮会就有了不可或缺的自我保护需求。在当时的政治格局中，华人黑社会组织巧妙的置身于马来土著政权和英国的殖民行政势力之间并配合得体。

一方面，华社黑帮不挑战马来土著政权，也对以间接手段殖民马来亚的英国政权毕恭毕敬，完全以侨民自居，遵守英殖民统治规章。华人黑社会和英殖民者的妥协关系是各取所需。总的来说，英殖民者默认华人黑社会各自的“自治权”，包括属于合法的鸦片买卖，开设赌场和妓馆等。向商贩收保护费也纯属华社“内政”而不受干预，因为黑社会借此收入维持地方“治安”，有减免英殖民当局警力不少开销的作用。

但走私属逃避税收，影响殖民统治和马来统治者收入，被严厉打击。赌博本为中国农民传统民间习俗和生活方式，无需严禁。至于娼妓，鉴于华人移民19世纪时期的8男1女比例，城市妓馆因生意需求而随处可见，不亚于19世纪后半期美国西部拓荒期间的客栈酒吧场景。

阐述历史真相的确需要一股强大的勇气，但这个勇气应以中肯，并以当时历史背景客观阐述为基础，对发生过的事迹坦诚交代，不夸张，也不偏袒，更不要觉得可耻。一个客观的西班牙后裔南美洲学者不会隐瞒16到17世纪西班牙殖民者的贪婪和对印第安土著民的残暴。一个真正的德国学者更不会为二战时期纳粹德国的罪行辩解和袒护。

谨此祈望我们马来西亚华人学者同样可以做到这点。

黄大志《叶亚来的黑社会身份可耻吗？》英文版：Is Yap Ah Loy's gangster background shameful?

Whether Yap Ah Loy, the esteemed pioneer of Kuala Lumpur, was a gangster remains a contentious issue. Malay nationalists, citing Yap Ah Loy's alleged connections to organized crime, have denigrated him as a lowly leader, unworthy of being regarded as a figure of respect. Regarding the question of whether Yap Ah Loy truly holds the title of Kuala Lumpur's pioneer, these nationalists, motivated by racial politics, exhibit reluctance in acknowledging this assertion from the local Chinese community. They counter this perspective by asserting that Malay ancestors had already established their presence north of the confluence of the Klang and Gombak Rivers in what is now the city centre of Kuala Lumpur prior to Yap Ah Loy's arrival in 1857.

It is indeed factual that a small contingent of Malay ancestors had settled in present-day Kuala Lumpur before Yap Ah Loy's emergence. This is indisputable, as the Malays have historically inhabited riverine areas, engaging in traditional rice cultivation and fishing—practices that were prevalent in the 19th century. However, the crux of the matter lies in the nuanced interpretation of the term "pioneer." In academic discourse, the concept of pioneering is largely divorced from the traditional self-sustaining practices of small-scale rice farming and fishing. Development that embodies a pioneering essence should be intrinsically linked to economic advancement. In the context of Kuala Lumpur's evolution, the pivotal factor was the active involvement of the Chinese in tin mining undertakings, which bore significant connections to international trade, subsequently catalyzing the urban transformation of the area.

Nevertheless, some scholars within the Chinese community, seemingly attempting to shield themselves from criticism, endeavour to perpetuate the image of early Chinese leaders while defending their integrity and dignity. These scholars contend that the Chinese in Malaysia have long faced discrimination from the dominating ethnic group. Consequently, discussing the failings of their community leaders, many of whom possess underworld affiliations, is perceived as an insult to their ethnic prestige and reputation. Therefore, citing their dark past is utterly intolerable! Hence, when examining early ethnic Chinese leaders, these scholars prioritize the commendable while obscuring the less savory aspects. Whenever feasible, they feel compelled to extol the virtues of those who are honourable while concealing their darker inclinations. In doing so, they not only pay due respect to the deceased with dignity but also avert potential offense to their living descendants. Furthermore, this approach serves to safeguard the Chinese community from potential assaults by unfriendly factions who might exploit such revelations to inflict harm.

However, the key question persists: Over a century and a half ago, were the identities of the underworld triad leaders within the Malayan Chinese community regarded as disreputable when viewed through the lens of the prevailing social values of that colonial era? To address this inquiry, we must begin by contextualizing the era, which inherited the social characteristics of a semi-feudal Chinese society that largely lacked a genuine rule of law in the modern sense of the term.

The Social Foundations of the Underworld Triads

The secret societies once prevalent in Malaysia and Singapore are similar to the American Mafia, both originating from immigrants from China and Italy, respectively. Chinese triad organizations evolved into what are commonly known as secret societies in Malaysia and Singapore. Triads in traditional Chinese society were extremely active during the era of despotic imperial China and were indeed a historical tradition then. People formed gangs through clandestine means, based on geographical origins, professional ties, blood or clan connections, and political motivations. In a society with little rule of law, and where officials generally had to rely on additional income from public offerings to supplement their meager salaries provided by the imperial court, triads became a means of self-protection, to seize special favours, or to leverage their power to collaborate with the officials. With government protection, triad organizations often engaged in activities such as the government-monopolized salt trade, drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, and sometimes robbery, among others.

Because triad organizations possessed their own financial resources and power, they were able to leverage these resources to curry favour with government officials for survival. However, to protect their territory and revenue sources, they needed their own armed forces to combat potential threats from rival gangs and maintain their illegal operations, including intimidating wealthy businessmen or engaging in paid extortion. By today's moral standards, this was undoubtedly a subculture of professional criminal gangs. These criminal organizations possessed their own financial and security mechanisms, and faced intense conflicts of interest and confrontation with the ruling authorities, who controlled the dominant culture, making them targets of sanctions.

The Compromise Between the Chinese Triads and British Colonialism in Malaya

Nonetheless, during the colonial era in Malaya in the mid-19th century, Chinese triad organizations were not solely illicit entities. When poverty-stricken Chinese peasants, who embodied the legacies of these subcultures and occupied the lower echelons of society, migrated abroad, they formed gangs out of necessity for self-protection. Within the political milieu of the time, Chinese triads cautiously positioned themselves between the Malay sultanate regimes and the British colonial administration, with whom they engaged in effective compromise.

While refraining from challenging the Malay sultanate regimes, Chinese gangs also upheld a deferential stance towards the British, who indirectly governed Malaya, by comporting themselves as immigrants devoid of political aspirations and adhering to the stipulations of British colonial rule. This accord between the Chinese triads and the British colonial authorities proved mutually advantageous. Generally speaking, the British colonial authorities acepted to the "autonomy" of the Chinese triads, encompassing the opium trade—which was, after all, legitimate —the operation of gambling establishments, and brothels.

The collection of protection fees by Chinese secret societies from local businessmen and petty traders was deemed a purely "internal" affair of the Chinese community and remained beyond the purview of interference. This revenue facilitated the triads in upholding local "law and order," thereby significantly alleviating the financial burden on the British colonial authorities' police force. However, smuggling, characterized as tax evasion and detrimental to the revenues of both the colonial administration and the Malay rulers, was met with severe punishment. Gambling, a traditional folk custom and lifestyle among Chinese peasants, did not warrant stringent prohibition. In terms of prostitution, given the 19th-century demographic ratio of six to eight men for every woman among Chinese immigrants, urban brothels proliferated due to robust demand, creating a landscape reminiscent of the salon-bars of the American West during the latter half of the 19th century.

Interpreting historical truth necessitates considerable courage, yet this courage should be rooted in objectivity and an impartial account of the historical context of the era. We ought to be forthright regarding the events that transpired, devoid of exaggeration, bias, or even shame. An objective scholar of South America of Spanish descent would not deny the greed of Spanish colonizers and their brutality towards Native American Indians in the 16th and 17th centuries. A true German scholar would not exonerate or condone the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during World War II.

I earnestly hope that Chinese scholars in Malaysia can embrace this same attitude.